Populism and the will of the people: how mathematics shows populism to be meaningless by Sandmann, Jan-Paul
Populism and the Will of the People: how Mathematics shows Populism to be meaningless
Jan-Paul Sandmann, Departments of Philosophy and Government, London School of Economics and Political Science
Motivation and argument
In recent years, populists across many countries have claimed to represent the ‘true’ will of the people. They argue that 
only they know what this will is, and that no one else, particularly so-called morally corrupt elites, ought to have a right to 
offer a political alternative. Using mathematical and logical arguments from social choice theory, I show that this claim I 
call ‘moral populism’ is meaningless. 
1. Condorcet’s Paradox: rational man, irrational society 
Suppose three voters can vote for three parties - Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats - and rank these 
parties in order of preference as follows (specific parties are for illustration, they could be replaced by x, y, z): 
Voter 1: Conservative ≻ Labour ≻ Liberal Democrats 
Voter 2: Labour ≻ Liberal Democrats ≻ Conservative 
Voter 3: Liberal Democrats ≻ Conservative ≻ Labour 
We use majority rule: one option beats another option if a majority, i.e. in this case at minimum two people, prefer 
it to that option. Society ‘has a preference’ for one option if a majority prefers that option to the other options. 
We see that Conservative beats Labour, Labour beats Lib Dem, Lib Dem beats Conservative, and so no option 
beats any other two! The social preference is cyclical:
Conservative ≻ Labour ≻ Liberal Democrats ≻ Conservative [...]. 
It should be visible that it is not at all clear which party society prefers. This problem was first noted by 18th 
century mathematician Nicolas de Condorcet. It suggested that, despite all individuals having clearly defined 
‘rational’ preferences over the parties, society’s preference could be random and thus be ‘irrational’. 
2. Arrow’s theorem
If there are more than two options from which voters can choose, no democratic voting rule mutually satisfies the 
five axioms of the theorem. Granted that all axioms are intuitive criteria any democratic voting rule should satisfy, we 
cannot guarantee that the social preference is ’rational’, and thus that the will of the people is clearly defined.  
Two notions of ‘populist democracy’
To do so, I compare two differently motivated notions of populism, due to i. Riker (1982), a pioneer in applying social choice theory 
to the study of democracy and ii. Müller (2016), a contemporary democratic theorist.
i. Aggregative populism: government by the will of the people which is revealed through aggregating individual 
preferences in society. 
ii. Moral populism: representation of the ’true’ - i.e. anti-elitist, morally pure - will of the people. 
To clarify, what ’the will of the people’ means, I pose two questions: 
i. Ontological question: does the ‘will of the people’ exist? 
ii. Epistemological question: if it exists, do we know what it is?
Meaningless populist democracy 
If, on the basis of these arguments, we accept that for most political decision situations the will of the people is 
meaningless, aggregative populism must be a meaningless democratic ideal since it crucially depends on voting 
revealing the general will. Further, this argument entails a rejection of moral populism: crudely put, if the general will 
does not exist, we cannot identify any kind of ‘true’, morally pure, will of the people. It seems that both notions of 
populism are meaningless, and thus that any form of democracy that relies on the will of the people is unfounded. 
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Deliberative democracy: a defence 
of the will of the people and 
aggregative populism
List et al. (2013), however, show that there is an 
‘escape-route’ out of Arrow’s theorem that can 
defend the general will as a meaningful 
democratic concept. 
If a sufficiently large fraction of individual 
preferences are single-peaked, meaning the 
alternatives can be ranked according to one 
peak, from, say, an ideological left to right scale 
(see graph to the right), no cycles can occur, and 
thus the social preference is rational. 
Empirically, List et al. have shown that under 
certain institutional conditions deliberation among 
voters can induce ’meta-agreement’, a shared 
understanding of the structure of the alternatives, 
leading to proximity to single-peakedness, and 
therewith a higher probability of a rational social 
preference and a defined will of the people.
Therefore: aggregative populism is meaningful if 
preference aggregation, preceded by deliberation, 
successfully reveals the general will.
Moral populism is truly meaningless
Note, however, that moral populism precludes any form of 
constructive deliberation by claiming that only populists know 
what the ‘true’ general will is. 
Therefore, while aggregative populism can potentially be 
meaningful if deliberation induces single-peakedness, moral 
populism must (unconditionally) be meaningless because it 
depends on a logically unfounded notion of the ‘true’ will of 
the people. Moral populism is truly meaningless!
The graph shows how a voter’s 
preference profile can be single-
peaked by aligning alternatives 
(x-axis) in order of preference (y-
axis).
Both notions depend on the notion of the ‘will of the 
people’, but a group of mathematical results show that the 
will of the people may either (i) not exist or (ii) may be  
hard, if not impossible, to discover in most real-world 
political situations. 
